Interview of Shrimati Sushma Swaraj, Minister of Information & Broadcasting (I&B) by Mr. Syed Talat Hussein of Pakistan Television (PTV) |
PTV: Thank you, Mrs. Sushma Swarajji it is a matter of great pleasure that you have been kind enough to spare your precious time for the programme to answer a few questions that arise in the minds of the people of India and Pakistan. The crucial point is that these questions seem to defy satisfactory answers. It is your second visit to Pakistan, isn't it? Minister (I&B): Yes, it is.
Minister (I&B): Which news do you refer to? I am not aware of it, So I can't discuss it.
Minister (I&B): I have already told you that I am on a visit with special aims and objectives. Bilateral issues are not discussed here. I might have to attend the SAARC meeting if it had been in Columbo, Dakka, Maldives or any where for that matter, with the same objectives, as per the defined norms. I do not want to undermine the importance of SAARC. It is a Forum constituted for the regional Co-operation. This is the reason that the Indian Govt. decided to send me to attend the meeting in Islamabad without any reservation and preconceived notion. If the Indian Govt. had not sent its representative it would have been a lapse on its part. It is just a chance that the meeting is held in Islamabad. And this is still a chance that I am the Minister for Information and Broadcasting and this conference is meant basically for the Ministers for Information and Broadcasting. This is not my visit to Pakistan, rather I am here to attend the SAARC meeting as a minister. So, I didn't discuss bilateral issues before leaving India nor will I here.
Minister (I&B): No. See, everything was altogether different in Kathmandu. The P.M. himself went back to India from Kathmandu to take a decision. He initiated one thing, so why should we talk about the past whether it had been so or otherwise? The SAARC forum must be free to hold a meeting anywhere. We should participate in it wherever it is held.
Minister (I&B): No. Not at all.
Minister (I&B): Again, you are rehashing the same thing.
Minister (I&B): I would again like to say that this is beyond the objective of my visit. If you insist on it, I would like to say that the forces have not been deployed on the border without reason or rhyme. It is not an ordinary decision to deploy forces on the border. There must have been critical conditions under which the forces had been deployed. Now, the question is whether there is some change in the conditions.
Minister (I&B): It is crystal clear. It goes without saying. Whatever happened after the 13th December - one after another, would alarm any country to be vigilant enough to ensure the national security. If the forces have been deployed on account of these, the forces may be withdrawn provided that the conditions are congenial and conducive. If there is some agreeable change in the condition, no one would like to deploy the forces on the border.
Minister (I&B): Speaking openly and explicitly too has its restrictions. I am a minister and am airing my views on the TV channel of a foreign country, this too is a binding and restriction for me. I am not here for bilateral talks so I can't transgress the limit. Still, I have said that the Indian Govt. has asked the Pakistani Govt. for certain issues: we gave a list of men and demanded that Pakistan hand them over to us; we demanded that cross border terrorism be eliminated and asked the Pakistan Govt. to ban intrusions and infiltration. The relations have been embittered on account of certain reasons and in order to mend the severed relationship, the condition has to be made conducive and congenial. If the ground situations are agreeably changed, the forces will be withdrawn from the border and the relationship will be renewed and maintained. Thus, such meaningless decisions ....
Minister (I&B): I do not want to go in details of these things. It does not mean that I have no answer to this question. I do have but, as I have already said, I am here on a visit to attend the SAARC meeting, whatever I spoke here is a token discussion. One can't discuss these things on the TV channel. If you want to discuss it at length, adopt the right way and use the right forum. There are some other things too for which the Indian govt. has asked the Pakistani Govt. for action. The Pakistani Govt. verbally committed itself to be doing the same. But mere lip service does not do. One has to do at least part of what one has committed oneself to do wholly.
Minister (I&B): Naturally, the same country.
Minister (I&B): Let me know what Pakistan did.
Minister (I&B): You are again mistaken in your approach to the issues you should be aware of the fact that once India and Pakistan decided not to have any arbitrator. There would be no third party mediation because they would solve their problems through bilateral discussion. Now there is no need of an arbitrator. If we put forth certain ways to initiate a discussion, it sounds good. If you ask us to do some thing, only you have to scrutinize our response. There is no need of an arbitrator.
Minister (I&B):It is good that you raised this issue. There is a striking difference between terrorism issue and that of Kashmir. We will solve mutual problems through bilateral discussion. We took up cross border terrorism at the international level and there is a positive and efficacious response. Pakistan was also a party in coalition in this regard where terrorism was condemned in strongest sense by Secretary of State Colin Powell, the European Union, Russia, China, France, Britain and so on . Terrorism is an international problem. There is a global coalition for fighting and eliminating it. It is no bilateral issue.
Minister (I&B): No, I won't. The then Prime Ministers of India and Pakistan decided it through bilateral discussion. I am just repeating it. Take Shimla. The then Prime Minister of both the countries sat together in Lahore and Shimla. Governments do change, here as well as in India. And some government or other stays in power. If something has been decided by the previous government, the present govt. must abide by it, must make it functional and operative.
Minister (I&B): Yes it is. But I believe that you are drifting in a different direction.
Minister (I&B): To me it is important, this is why I believe that terrorism and our bilateral issues are two different things. Terrorism is an international problem. And the credit must go to India that did a lot for getting it included in the international agenda. Now there is a global coalition to fight and end terrorism. This is an answer to your question whether I'll decide. I have nothing to decide. I am repeating what my predecessors said, what the past government did and what our present government is doing in consonance with these decisions. Bilateral relations will be decided through bilateral discussion. There are two cornerstones: Shimla agreement and Lahore declaration. Decisions were taken together by these two countries, not by me.
Minister (I&B): It is good for both the countries that they decided that there would be no arbitrator. It is really bad for you to allow the third party mediator. If the problem is going to be solved, it will be through bilateral discussion only. So, you should advise your government. not to make a mistake of having an arbitrator. The third party belongs to none of the two main parties, thus it is indifferent to them and is for no good to any party. It does not matter much if the problem is stretched, lingers on. Under all circumstances, we have to decide on our own. As far as your statement 'One party says that it has done such and such things but the other party, says that nothing has yet been ' is concerned something substantial done can't be concealed. It will be observed by one and all because it is a ground reality.
Minister (I&B): It will be visible to every mind's eye. Situations will themselves bear witness. It is not something abstract. One can't have the temerity to claim that one has done such and such thing without having really done.
Minister (I&B): Statistics.
Minister (I&B): Needless to say. The government have all statistics. It is also needless to mention the statistics on the T.V. channel.
Minister (I&B): No, I do not have now. I was not aware of it that you would ask me such a question. But I am sure, the government do have the statistics of about two years. They have also exchanged the same.
Minister (I&B): It will be better by far, if we steer our discussion to other issues. Initially I told you not to discuss these things because I know that my answers will sound harsh. Your question is quite straight forward but my answer to this question will sound rather curt.
Minister (I&B): No, I wont. It is a breach of code of conduct to answer curtly while I am a guest here. Besides, it will also be a breach of India's code of conduct. We had better move to some other issue.
Minister (I&B): Problems will surely be solved. The government will sit together. But they will not be solved within thirty minutes as we are sitting here.
Minister (I&B): Your first sentence refers to our good relationship. There will be no question of bilateral forum, if we have no good relationship. But it is not correct. Why were the bilateral issues removed from SAARC charter? It was done so because such issues may embitter the relationship to the core and there will be no regional co-operation. Those people were not at all dense. They were farsighted and wise ones. This is why they did not club the regional co-operation forum with bi-lateral issues and the problems. You can't club these two, if you wish success in your attempt. We will not be able to discuss other things when you say that the charter of SAARC is redundant I do not feel that we are here for declaring it redundant. I do not feel that we are given to believe that bilateral contention and issues may be found in every region, not only between Pakistan and India. It may arise in Nepal, in Bangladesh, sometimes amongst themselves. There is no violence to mention here. We have already mentioned the problems. If we believe in the sentence you spoke in the beginning, we will prove that SAARC is redundant.
Minister (I&B): SAARC came into existence in presence of these realities. Those who constituted SAARC were directly related to these realities but they constituted SAARC so that other issues may also be dealt and discussed in a congenial atmosphere. It also helped a lot in the creation of congenial atmosphere. As already mentioned, some issues other than these were also discussed. These are not today's problems. As mentioned by you, they have been lurking for last 54 years. Now tell me, when was SAARC constituted? It means that all issues were there when the SAARC was constituted. It was recorded in its Charter that bilateral contentious issues will not be discussed. The SAARC Charter remains intact without any amendment in relation to discussion of bilateral issues.
Minister (I&B):It is not just today. India's commitment to peace is quite undiminished. Look! India is known as a peaceful nation. We gave the principle of non-violence to the whole world. It deeply shocks me if one talks to us by pointing a finger at India's peaceful character.
Minister (I&B): If you will become obdurate and say that it is a core dispute it will have to be brought to the table and no mention will be made of cross border terrorism. And on that too these will be a dispute today. As you just said whenever negotiations have taken place it needed the participation of both the sides.
Minister (I&B): No ! Once you said that it is unsigned. Now how could I know what kind of document you are holding.
Minister (I&B):No! It is not the question of false or true.
Minister (I&B):I am not an astrologer to forecast the future for you. There are forums for this. When there will be a formal response and it will appear in written form then the things will move on along it and they are ultimately bound to move together, amidst stagnation and hurdles and progress. All these things there have been. These stages I have enumerated. There are many a stages from the bomb to this day. There is Lahore trip after the nuclear bomb. And the Lahore trip is followed by Kargil which is, in turn, followed by uniform moratorium of hostilities. Then comes the invitation for Agra summit. Then there is 13 December and the happenings of 13 December. And deployment of army. But things do not stop at a point. If it does not stop, it is al right. It moves on when the obstruction is a little off the way.
Minister (I&B): Media men have written or lot about a number of persons. In 1977 following the defeat of Mrs. Gandhi. They wrote she had come back.... after complete 2/2 years. They wrote about us when we were away and Rajiv Gandhi become victorious with-403 He said that an end has been put to not only BJP but to all opposition parties. 403 wale Rajiv Gandhi was defeated in the next elections. Therefore, just see that in a democratic country such things will not happen. I ponder over on this point and pray God for the change of government through democratic and electoral process at least in India.
Minister (I&B): Let me first tell you that this is not true but wrong and secondly, it was the same BJP chief minister' who controlled the riots within 40-48 hours. That is why if any credit is to be given to BJP it is of controlling the riots earlier.
Minister (I&B): Sure.
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Wednesday, November 5, 2008
Full Text of Interview of Sushma Swraj on PTV
Wednesday, October 15, 2008
Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's Letter to Nehru
Full text of Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel's Letter to Jawaharlal Nehru on November 7, 1950 not only deploring Indian Ambassador KM Panikkar's action but also warning about dangers from China
My dear Jawaharlal,
Ever since my return from Ahmedabad and after the cabinet meeting the same day which I had to attend at practically fifteen minutes' notice and for which I regret I was not able to read all the papers, I have been anxiously thinking over the problem of Tibet and I thought I should share with you what is passing through my mind.
I have carefully gone through the correspondence between the External Affairs Ministry and our Ambassador in Peking and through him the Chinese Government. I have tried to peruse this correspondence as favourably to our Ambassador and the Chinese Government as possible, but I regret to say that neither of them comes out well as a result of this study. The Chinese Government has tried to delude us by professions of peaceful intention. My own feeling is that at a crucial period they managed to instill into our Ambassador a false sense of confidence in their so-called desire to settle the Tibetan problem by peaceful means. There can be no doubt that during the period covered by this correspondence the Chinese must have been concentrating for an onslaught on Tibet. The final action of the Chinese, in my judgement, is little short of perfidy. The tragedy of it is that the Tibetans put faith in us; they chose to be guided by us; and we have been unable to get them out of the meshes of Chinese diplomacy or Chinese malevolence. From the latest position, it appears that we shall not be able to rescue the Dalai Lama. Our Ambassador has been at great pains to find an explanation or justification for Chinese policy and actions. As the External Affairs Ministry remarked in one of their telegrams, there was a lack of firmness and unnecessary apology in one or two representations that he made to the Chinese Government on our behalf. It is impossible to imagine any sensible person believing in the so-called threat to China from Anglo-American machinations in Tibet. Therefore, if the Chinese put faith in this, they must have distrusted us so completely as to have taken us as tools or stooges of Anglo-American diplomacy or strategy. This feeling, if genuinely entertained by the Chinese in spite of your direct approaches to them, indicates that even though we regard ourselves as the friends of China, the Chinese do not regard us as their friends. With the Communist mentality of "whoever is not with them being against them", this is a significant pointer, of which we have to take due note. During the last several months, outside the Russian camp, we have practically been alone in championing the cause of Chinese entry into UN and in securing from the Americans assurances on the question of Formosa. We have done everything we could to assuage Chinese feelings, to allay its apprehensions and to defend its legitimate claims in our discussions and correspondence with America and Britain and in the UN. Inspite of this, China is not convinced about our disinterestedness; it continues to regard us with suspicion and the whole psychology is one, at least outwardly, of scepticism perhaps mixed with a little hostility. I doubt if we can go any further than we have done already to convince China of our good intentions, friendliness and goodwill. In Peking we have an Ambassador who is eminently suitable for putting across the friendly point of view. Even he seems to have failed to convert the Chinese. Their last telegram to us is an act of gross discourtesy not only in the summary way it disposes of our protest against the entry of Chinese forces into Tibet but also in the wild insinuation that our attitude is determined by foreign influences. It looks as though it is not a friend speaking in that language but a potential enemy.
In the background of this, we have to consider what new situation now faces us as a result of the disappearance of Tibet, as we knew it, and the expansion of China almost up to our gates. Throughout history we have seldom been worried about our north-east frontier. The Himalayas have been regarded as an impenetrable barrier against any threat from the north. We had a friendly Tibet which gave us no trouble. The Chinese were divided. They had their own domestic problems and never bothered us about frontiers. In 1914, we entered into a convention with Tibet which was not endorsed by the Chinese. We seem to have regarded Tibetan autonomy as extending to independent treaty relationship. Presumably, all that we required was Chinese counter-signature. The Chinese interpretation of suzerainty seems to be different. We can, therefore, safely assume that very soon they will disown all the stipulations which Tibet has entered into with us in the past. That throws into the melting pot all frontier and commercial settlements with Tibet on which we have been functioning and acting during the last half a century. China is no longer divided. It is united and strong. All along the Himalayas in the north and north-east, we have on our side of the frontier a population ethnologically and culturally not different from Tibetans and Mongoloids. The undefined state of the frontier and the existence on our side of a population with its affinities to the Tibetans or Chinese have all the elements of the potential trouble between China and ourselves. Recent and bitter history also tells us that Communism is no shield against imperialism and that the communists are as good or as bad imperialists as any other. Chinese ambitions in this respect not only cover the Himalayan slopes on our side but also include the important part of Assam. They have their ambitions in Burma also. Burma has the added difficulty that it has no McMahon Line round which to build up even the semblance of an agreement. Chinese irredentism and communist imperialism are different from the expansionism or imperialism of the western powers. The former has a cloak of ideology which makes it ten times more dangerous. In the guise of ideological expansion lie concealed racial, national or historical claims. The danger from the north and north-east, therefore, becomes both communist and imperialist. While our western and north-western threat to security is still as prominent as before, a new threat has developed from the north and north-east. Thus, for the first time, after centuries, India's defence has to concentrate itself on two fronts simultaneously. Our defence measures have so far been based on the calculations of superiority over Pakistan. In our calculations we shall now have to reckon with communist China in the north and in the north-east, a communist China which has definite ambitions and aims and which does not, in any way, seem friendly disposed towards us.
Let us also consider the political conditions on this potentially troublesome frontier. Our northern and north-eastern approaches consist of Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal areas in Assam. From the point of view of communication, there are weak spots. Continuous defensive lines do not exist. There is almost an unlimited scope for infiltration. Police protection is limited to a very small number of passes. There, too, our outposts do not seem to be fully manned. The contact of these areas with us is by no means close and intimate. The people inhabiting these portions have no established loyalty or devotion to India. Even Darjeeling and Kalimpong areas are not free from pro-Mongoloid prejudices. During the last three years, we have not been able to make any appreciable approaches to the Nagas and other hill tribes in Assam. European missionaries and other visitors had been in touch with them, but their influence was in no way friendly to India or Indians. In Sikkim, there was political ferment some time ago. It is quite possible that discontent is smouldering there. Bhutan is comparatively quiet, but its affinity with Tibetans would be a handicap. Nepal has a weak oligarchic regime based almost entirely on force: it is in conflict with a turbulent element of the population as well as with enlightened ideas of the modern age. In these circumstances, to make people alive to the new danger or to make them defensively strong is a very difficult task indeed and that difficulty can be got over only by enlightened firmness, strength and a clear line of policy. I am sure the Chinese and their source of inspiration, Soviet Union, would not miss any opportunity of exploiting these weak spots, partly in support of their ideology and partly in support of their ambitions. In my judgement the situation is one which we cannot afford either to be complacent or to be vacillating. We must have a clear idea of what we wish to achieve and also of the methods by which we should achieve it. Any faltering or lack of decisiveness in formulating our objectives or in pursuing our policies to attain those objectives is bound to weaken us and increase the threats which are so evident.
Side by side with these external dangers, we shall now have to face serious internal problems as well. I have already asked Iengar to send to the External Affairs Ministry a copy of the Intelligence Bureau's appreciation of these matters. Hitherto, the Communist Party of India has found some difficulty in contacting communists abroad, or in getting supplies of arms, literature, etc., from them. They had to contend with the difficult Burmese and Pakistan frontiers on the east or with the long seaboard. They shall now have a comparatively easy means of access to Chinese communists and through them to other foreign communists. Infiltration of spies, fifth columnists and communists would now be easier. Instead of having to deal with isolated communist pockets in Telengana and Warrangal we may have to deal with communist threats to our security along our northern and north-eastern frontiers, where, for supplies of arms and ammunition, they can safely depend on communist arsenals in China. The whole situation thus raises a number of problems on which we must come to an early decision so that we can, as I said earlier, formulate the objectives of our policy and decide the method by which those objectives are to be attained. It is also clear that the action will have to be fairly comprehensive, involving not only our defence strategy and state of preparations but also problem of internal security to deal with which we have not a moment to lose. We shall also have to deal with administrative and political problems in the weak spots along the frontier to which I have already referred.
It is of course, impossible to be exhaustive in setting out all these problems. I am, however, giving below some of the problems which, in my opinion, require early solution and round which we have to build our administrative or military policies and measures to implement them.
a) A military and intelligence appreciation of the Chinese threat to India both on the frontier and to internal security.
b) An examination of military position and such redisposition of our forces as might be necessary, particularly with the idea of guarding important routes or areas which are likely to be the subject of dispute.
c) An appraisement of the strength of our forces and, if necessary, reconsideration of our retrenchment plans for the Army in the light of the new threat.
d) A long-term consideration of our defence needs. My own feeling is that, unless we assure our supplies of arms, ammunition and armour, we would be making our defence perpetually weak and we would not be able to stand up to the double threat of difficulties both from the west and north-west and north and north-east.
e) The question of China's entry into the UN. In view of the rebuff which China has given us and the method which it has followed in dealing with Tibet, I am doubtful whether we can advocate its claim any longer. There would probably be a threat in the UN virtually to outlaw China, in view of its active participation in the Korean war. We must determine our attitude on this question also.
f) The political and administrative steps which we should take to strengthen our northern and north-eastern frontier. This would include the whole of the border, ie. Nepal, Bhutan, Sikkim, Darjeeling and the tribal territory in Assam.
g) Measures of internal security in the border areas as well as the states flanking those areas such as Uttar Pradesh, Bihar, Bengal and Assam.
h) Improvement of our communication, road, rail, air and wireless, in these areas and with the frontier outposts.
i) The future of our mission at Lhasa and the trade posts at Gyangtse and Yatung and the forces which we have in operation in Tibet to guard the trade routes.
j) The policy in regard to the McMahon Line.
These are some of the questions which occur to my mind. It is possible that a consideration of these matters may lead us into wider question of our relationship with China, Russia, America, Britain and Burma. This, however, would be of a general nature, though some might be basically very important, e.g., we might have to consider whether we should not enter into closer association with Burma in order to strengthen the latter in its dealings with China. I do not rule out the possibility that, before applying pressure on us, China might apply pressure on Burma. With Burma, the frontier is entirely undefined and the Chinese territorial claims are more substantial. In its present position, Burma might offer an easier problem to China, and therefore, might claim its first attention.
I suggest that we meet early to have a general discussion on these problems and decide on such steps as we might think to be immediately necessary and direct, quick examination of other problems with a view to taking early measures to deal with them.
Vallabhbhai Patel
7th November 1950